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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Martha Moore appeals pursuant to her conditional guilty plea, challenging the 
district court's decision to deny her motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to an 
illegal search. The State concedes that the officers' search was not justified by the 
terms of Mr. Mclnelly's (Ms. Moore's adult son) probation. That leaves only consent as 
a possible justification for the warrantless search in this case. Ms. Moore contends that 
the consent on which the State relies was not, in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, voluntarily given. 
The State argues that, since the two probation officers testified that Ms. Moore 
had not resisted their search (Ms. Moore testified that they told her that they were 
authorized to search the house pursuant to Mr. Mclnelly's probation), the consent was 
valid. However, the totality of the circumstances, which includes Officer Foltz's 
testimony regarding the nature of the search, indicates that the officers were, at least 
implicitly, relying on the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation to justify the search, and that 
Ms. Moore merely acquiesced to their claim of authority. Combined with the fact that 
there were five uniformed, armed officers present, the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrate that Ms. Moore's consent was not voluntarily given, and thus, the district 
court's refusal to suppress the subsequently-discovered evidence was in error. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Moore's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during an illegal 




The District Court Erred By Not Suppressing The Evidence Found During An Illegal 
Search Which Was Conducted Without The Voluntary, Knowing, And Intelligent 
Consent Of Ms. Moore 
A. Introduction 
The State concedes that Mr. Mclnelly's waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights 
did not authorize the officers to search Ms. Moore's bedroom or her purse. (Resp. 
Br., pp.8-9.) Therefore, the search was valid only if Ms. Moore gave voluntary consent 
to search her bedroom and her purse. The totality of the circumstances shows that she 
did not give voluntary consent. Rather, they show that she, in the presence of five 
uniformed and armed officers, acquiesced to the erroneous assertion of authority to 
search pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. Therefore, the search violated 
her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from warrantless searches, and the evidence 
found as a result of that search should have been suppressed. 
B. Ms. Moore Did Not Give Voluntary Consent To Search Her Bedroom Or Her 
Purse 
First, the State asserts that "[Ms.] Moore does not challenge the district court's 
finding that officers were lawfully in her home to search for evidence relating to possible 
violations of Mr. Mclnelly's probation." (Resp. Br., p.8.) Ms. Moore has made no such 
admission, as she is challenging whether there was a lawful search of her home and 
property, especially those portions of the home for which Mr. Mclnelly could not 
authorize searches (namely, Ms. Moore's bedroom and purse). The officers were not, 
in point of fact, present to "search for evidence relating to possible violations of 
Mr. Mclnelly's probation" as the State claims. The record is very clear that the officers 
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were only there to execute an arrest warrant for Mr. Mclnelly. (See, e.g., Tr., p.8, Ls.22-
25 (Officer Guiberson testifying "I [was] also going to Mr. Mclnelly's residence to arrest 
him on an outstanding warrant."); R., p.63 (the district court stating 'The purpose of the 
visit was to find and arrest Mclnelly on a bench warrant").) The State appears to have 
confused execution of an arrest warrant with an investigation for potential violations, 
which is wholly improper. "An entry into a home to execute an arrest warrant is for the 
limited purpose of accomplishing the arrest of the individual named in the warrant. "1 
State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 658 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). For the entry pursuant to an arrest warrant to be lawful, the 
officers must "demonstrate a reasonable belief that the arrestee could be found within 
the residence at the time of entry." Id. Ms. Moore does not challenge the officer's initial 
entry, but she has challenged their subsequent actions, particularly those undertaken 
after the officers confirmed that Mr. Mclnelly was not present, such as the search of her 
bedroom and her purse. 
Arrest warrants do not give the officers carte blanche to search the house: '"the 
officers may not intrude into the house over the objection of the arrestee, simply to 
complete effectuation of the arrest and put the officers into a position where they can 
1 Certainly, as part of that initial entry, the officers were entitled to conduct a protective 
sweep of the house. See Northover, 133 Idaho at 660. However, the officers 
performed that sweep while Ms. Moore was in the bathroom. (Tr., p.17, L.16- p.18, L.1; 
Tr., p.51, Ls.14-17.) Evidently, they found nothing disconcerting during that sweep, as 
they did not arrest Ms. Moore upon her emergence from the bathroom. At any rate, the 
protective sweep would not justify the search of Ms. Moore's purse, since a person 
could not have been hiding inside her purse. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 
(1990) (a protective sweep is narrowly confined to a visual inspection of places where a 
person might be hiding). As such, the premise asserted by the State, that the officers 
were lawfully present to search for evidence of a probation violation, is directly contrary 
to the facts in the record, as well as established case law, and so should be rejected. 
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more fully observe the interior of the premises-absent any other reasonable 
justification for the entry, such as consent to a search .... "' State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 
29, 32 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. Peterson, 108 Idaho 463, 465 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
Exceeding the limited scope of the arrest warrant constitutes an impermissible invasion 
of the person's Fourth Amendment rights. Id.; Peterson, 108 Idaho at 465. As such, 
the officers were not lawfully in Ms. Moore's house to search for evidence of probation 
violations, as the State contends. They still needed valid consent to be present and 
search the house as they did, and Ms. Moore did not give valid consent.2 
The remainder of the State's arguments in regard to the voluntariness of 
Ms. Moore's consent center around the testimony of Officer Guiberson and Officer 
Aldous, who both testified that Ms. Moore consented to Officer Guiberson's request to 
search Ms. Moore's bedroom and purse and did not resist that search. (Resp. 
Br., pp.9-12.) The fact that she did not resist their search shows nothing more than 
acquiescence to the officer's assertions of a right to search. Additionally, whether or not 
Ms. Moore gave consent is not the issue; the issue is whether that consent was 
voluntary or, instead, whether it was the product of the officers overbearing Ms. Moore's 
will. (See App. Br., pp.10-12.) Such testimony as the State relies on in this regard "is 
evidence only of consent, not proof of its voluntariness." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 
2 In fact, the fact that the officers lost their reasonable belief that Mr. Mclnelly was 
present when they confirmed Mr. Mclnelly was not at the house is a factor 
demonstrating that Ms. Moore's subsequent consent was not voluntary, since the 
officers' continued presence in Ms. Moore's house was no longer justified by the 
warrant. (See App. Br., p.12 (discussing the fact that only Ms. Moore and her teenage 
son were present as a fact to be considered in the totality of the circumstances 
regarding voluntariness of Ms. Moore's consent).) 
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98 (Ct. App. 2006). As such, those arguments should be disregarded. Ultimately, the 
totality of the circumstances shows that Ms. Moore's consent was not voluntary. 
First, Ms. Moore was surrounded by uniformed, armed officers, three of whom 
were inside her house while two others waited outside. (Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18.) The State 
admits that this is one factor that should be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances. (Resp. Br., p.12) While not dispositive, the fact that a citizen is 
surrounded by multiple uniformed and armed officers does carry weight indicating that 
the consent was not voluntary. Compare Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 98. 
In addition, the officers represented that they had a legal right to search the 
premises pursuant to Mr. Mclnelly's probation. (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10.) 
The State contends that Ms. Moore's testimony in this regard should be disregarded 
based on the district court's weighing of creditability. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) 
However, the district court's analysis in that regard was primarily directed at resolving 
the conflict of whether Mr. Mclnelly continued to reside in Ms. Moore's home. (R, pp.64, 
67.) The district court did not state that Ms. Moore was a wholly uncredible witness; 
merely that it did not believe her in regard to whether Mr. Mclnelly was still living in her 
home. (See R., pp.62-68.) 
Regarding the question of whether the officers represented that they had the 
lawful authority to search the house pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation, 
Officer Foltz's testimony, which is not discussed in the Respondent's Brief, reinforces 
Ms. Moore's testimony that the officers were (mistakenly) operating under the authority 
of the probation agreement as they conducted their search. Officer Foltz, the other 
officer who entered Ms. Moore's home, testified that he was relying on Officer 
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Guiberson to instruct him where he could search pursuant to the terms of their target's 
probation agreement. (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24, p.71, Ls.1-21.) This indicates that the 
officers were using the probation agreement as the justification for their search of 
Ms. Moore's home, despite the fact that they had confirmed that the target of their arrest 
warrant was not there. 3 Besides that, by Officer Guiberson's own admission, the search 
was to determine whether the house was an appropriate residence for a probationer.4 
(Tr., p.24, Ls.2-7.) That information reinforces that the officers were justifying their 
search to Ms. Moore based on the terms of the probation agreement, and corroborates 
Ms. Moore's claim that the officers told her that they had the authority to search her 
home, which, as the State conceded, they could not do in regard to Ms. Moore's 
bedroom and purse. 
The State also attempts to rely on the discussion that Officer Guiberson 
purportedly had with Ms. Moore prior to Mr. Mclnelly's release as evidence that she 
consented to Officer Guiberson's subsequent search. (Resp. Br., p.7.) During that 
conversation, Officer Guiberson purportedly informed Ms. Moore that, as part of 
Mr. Mclnelly's probation, she would be allowed to search Ms. Moore's house. (R., p.66.) 
However, as the State conceded, that is not entirely true. As such, it only means that 
3 They actually had a fairly reliable idea of where he would be, since Officer Guiberson 
had told Mr. Mclnelly to meet her at the probation office in fifteen minutes. (Tr., p.21, 
L.18 - p.22, L.4.) However, Officer Guiberson decided not to go and prepare for that 
meeting, but rather, stayed to search Ms. Moore's home. (See Tr., p.22, Ls.5-18.) 
4 Officer Guiberson's testimony, that she could not remember explicitly telling Ms. Moore 
that she could search the whole house pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation 
(Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15), does not directly contradict Ms. Moore's testimony that such a 
comment was made (direct contradiction would be something like "I did not say that."). 
As such, there was no direct evidence contradicting Ms. Moore's testimony on that 
point. 
7 
the erroneous representation was repeated to Ms. Moore on multiple occasions, 
reinforcing the coercive effect of those erroneous representations to Ms. Moore. 
Therefore, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search demonstrates 
that Ms. Moore's consent was not voluntary because it was merely acquiescing to an 
erroneous assertion of legal right to search. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118 (Ct. App. 2007). As 
such, her consent does not justify the warrantless search, and the evidence found as a 
result should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Moore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying her motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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